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Enigmatic. Inscrutable. Justice Byron R. White, to many, is a puzzle. A
lifelong Democrat, campaign manager in Colorado for John Kennedy's election
in 1960, civil rights frontiersman in Robert Kennedy's Justice Department,
President Kennedy's first appointment to the Court. And yet, conservative,
dissenter in Miranda v. Arizona' and Roe v. Wade,' author of Bowers v.
Hardwick,3 the Republicans' unanticipated revenge for President Eisenhower's
appointment of Justice Brennan only seven years before. This is the
conventional jurisprudential/political cut on the 95th member of the Supreme
Court of the United States. Puzzle unsolved. Enigma remains.
But some puzzles remain unsolved because we walk away from them too
quickly. Justice White's contributions to the Court are too significant, too
numerous, and too sustained to dismiss so easily. Nor will it do, as those
hostile to his most publicized judicial writings tend to do, to simply say good
riddance. It is unfair and insensitive to dismiss an entire generation of legal
work by a highly influential Justice much admired by judicial colleagues who
cut across philosophical lines.
Recall Justice Douglas' comment placing Byron White into the select
category of Justices whom Douglas dubbed "great." Justice White stood for
things, he was clear and admirably consistent in those stands, and he didn't try
to fawn, aggrandize himself, or play to the bleachers-the press, or for that
matter, anyone else. He never sought judicial glory. The athletic whiz,
superhero of the gridiron, the man with the resume of the century, never
worked the law schools or the salons of the legal establishment.
Part of Justice White's modesty, strangely enough, is that he is shy.
Socially awkward, I have heard some say. And a tough, no-nonsense judge.
During the mid-1970's, when I observed him from the law clerk galleries, he
seemed to delight in nailing counsel to the wall. I think he softened in manner
and style as the years went by, moving into his eighth decade with a more
graceful, more patient approach to counsel at the podium. But whether his style
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and temperament changed or not, two constants remained: Justice White was
and is a very smart, able lawyer, and he was no equivocator when it came to
the substance of the Court's work. My armchair opinion is that his approach
was a function of a rugged independence of mind rather than a lack of charm.
He did not politick within the Court to get votes or otherwise win over those
who were less secure in their own views. Solid moorings kept him in port,
safely in harbor, not to be beaten about by waves out in the open sea. He
didn't need to "grow." He was full grown when he arrived at the Court in
1962.
Justice White's maturity of thought had much to do with ideas that were
once quite lovingly familiar to liberals. Before the emergence of the rights
culture, strongly shared views among those who participated in-or, in Justice
White's case, observed-the constitutional revolution wrought by the New
Deal was that government was a force for good and should be given a chance
to work to solve people's problems. The New Dealers saw the baleful
influence of a rights-oriented, libertarian Court standing in the way of
government efforts to better the lot of the American people, and they didn't
like it.
Such views are perhaps a generational thing, but they are rooted firmly in
a philosophical outlook that was well developed and consistently followed.
Yes, Justice White would rebuff new constitutional challenges to traditional
social mores, as in Bowers v. Hardwick,4 just as he would reject constitutional
arguments preventing government from increasing its efficiency through the
legislative veto device5 or the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings plan to reduce the
federal deficit.6 He trusted the people and, consequently, their elected
representatives. The American people had good common sense, and social
pathologies were unlikely to prevail, at least for long. So too, law enforcement
should be given a chance to work. It was up to the people, not judges, to
devise an operations manual for local police departments. His dissent in
Miranda7 was a classic in this respect.
Justice White may well have been the last true believer in government. As
I write, notions of reinventing government are being bandied about, so perhaps
we are returning to the underlying ideals of Justice White's world, the New
Deal-government can and should solve the problems of the people. While
that hangs in the balance, what prevails now on the Court is not a culture of
deference to the administrative state. Far from it. But in Justice White's day
and Justice White's mind, things were different. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC,8 the justices were called to consider a First Amendment challenge to
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the FCC's "fairness doctrine." A principal objection to that doctrine-which
required broadcasters to play "fair" by presenting views opposed to their
own-was the possibility that it would cause broadcasters to engage in self-
censorship: to meet their duty of fairness, they would ensure that no duty
would ever be triggered; that they would substitute for their possibly single-
minded coverage no coverage at all. These are powerful objections. They are
answered in the Court's opinion, authored by Justice White, with citations to
two New Deal era decisions and a brusque admonishment that it was by then
settled that "the Commission was more than a traffic policeman concerned with
the technical aspects of broadcasting and that it neither exceeded its powers
under the statute nor transgressed the First Amendment in interesting itself in
the general program format and the kinds of programs broadcast by
licensees."9 Red Lion arises at the crossroads of conflicting liberties-the
speech rights of broadcasters and those of the dissenting public. To Justice
White, it was clear that fateful collisions between these rights could be averted
by stationing in the midst of their intersection not a cop, but a traffic control
specialist, expertly trained, public-minded, and zealous in the performance of
his duties. If in an age of skepticism the entire tone of Red Lion resonates with
an almost quaint ring, it is the echo of the New Dealer's faith in government.
The Justice's critics might naturally be expected to applaud Red Lion-or
at least its pro-regulatory result-while decrying his handiwork in other
individual liberty versus governmental power cases. That reaction seems to
reveal a political agenda, rather than a fully worked out, consistent approach
to the role of the judiciary in a democratic society. But even if I am wrong
about the Justice's critics, I am nonetheless confident about Justice White's
well-thought, consistent views. Yes, views change over time. But with that
obvious exception, it was rare that one would find Justice White embracing,
in short order, flatly contradictory positions. He knew what he thought and
didn't bounce from one position to another-which is a polite way of saying
that he was principle-oriented, rather than result-oriented.
Take separation of powers again, where his views come shining through
with remarkable consistency. Compare the positions of the Justices in two
cases raising in short succession very similar issues of very basic
principles-CFTC v. Schorl0 and Morrison v. Olson." Justice White
unerringly and faithfully followed his chosen principle: Congress could vest
the CFTC with certain limited Article II adjudicatory powers, and it could
confer on an "independent counsel" powers that were at the core of executive
authority. For a study in contrast, examine those Justices who dissented in
CFTC v. Schor, holding that there could be no dilution of judicial power
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conferred by Article III, period-not even tiny, seemingly innocuous,
steps-but who later joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Morrison, which sustained baby steps of divesting executive power. Justice
White suffered from no such inconsistency.
Jurisprudence aside, Justice White also had the keenest sense of the
Court's institutional responsibilities. The Court's docket has shrunk
considerably in recent years, as the Justices have complained that the merits
docket doesn't have the meat of bygone years. Some Court observers,
including me, are skeptical of this. But through all that, Justice White has been
like an ancient prophet, a judicial Jeremiah-albeit a more polite, less
eschatological one-urging the Justices to do their solemn duty. "Decide cases
that need to be decided," he seemed to be saying to his eight colleagues. His
repeated dissents from denials of certiorari represent an outpouring, more in
sorrow than anger, of a roll-up-the-sleeves Justice. The White homily seemed
to be this: We are here to do a job, and let's get on with it; and that job
includes keeping the body of federal law reasonably harmonious and uniform.
Justice White seemed wonderfully mature and diligent in his voting
behavior on certiorari. I was impressed with his feet-on-the-ground approach
that most lawyers out in the real world representing real clients with real
problems would admire. Not every First Amendment claim to walk through the
Supreme Court doors needed to crowd out a plain old vanilla case that real
courts of law wrestle with day in and day out. Indeed, maybe, just maybe,
there would be plenty of room for both if the Court were willing to play the
full four quarters of the game, rather than calling the game off shortly after
halftime.
Now this is not to say that Justice White took constitutional claims lightly.
He was, after all, in the majority in many of the free speech and free press
cases of note, including the watershed decision New York Times v. Sullivan.'"
But he had an old-fashioned work ethic driven by a deep sense of institutional
responsibility. Once again, government worked. And that included the Supreme
Court, of which he was immensely proud. He was upbeat and confident about
it, anxious for it to fulfill its assigned responsibility of deciding cases and
controversies, and yet not standing in the way of self-government.
To me, all that is admirable. But it cuts against the culture of both the
legal academy and the legal salons of Washington and New York. That's a
shame, for it means that the Justice who William 0. Douglas called "great" is
leaving without the admiration and applause that he deserves. But part of the
greatness of Justice White is that he doesn't seem to care about the small
chorus of bravos. He did his duty, and never seemed to worry about issuing
self-promoting press releases or whether his opinions would be praised by the
New York Times or the Washington Post. The great running back, NFL Rookie
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of the Year, and Rhodes Scholar played the judicial game with a lot of talent
but with an even larger dose of integrity and judgment. It was an honor to
argue before him. I will miss him.

